

Attribute-Based Access and Communication Control Models for Cloud and Cloud-Enabled Internet of Things

Ph.D. Dissertation Defense:

Smriti Bhatt

Institute for Cyber Security (ICS)
Department of Computer Science
University of Texas at San Antonio

Ph.D. Dissertation Committee:

Dr. Ravi Sandhu, Chair


Dr. Murtuza Jadliwala

Dr. Palden Lama

Dr. Gregory White

Dr. Rohit Valecha

Cloud-Enabled IoT (CE-IoT)



*Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_of_things#/media/File:Internet_of_Things.jpg

Access Control

*Secure data, information,
and resources from
unauthorized entities*

Communication Control

*Secure communication and
data flow from one
component to other*

Traditional Access Control Models:

Discretionary Access Control (DAC) –

Ownership,

Mandatory Access Control (MAC) –

Security Levels,

Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) –

Roles,


Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) –

Attributes, ...

Communication Control Examples:

Firewall, Routing Tables, Guards, ...


Formal models ???




- Significant gap between theoretical *ABAC* models and their application in real-world Cloud and CE-IoT platforms
- Fundamental lack of knowledge and academic literature on *Attribute-Based Communication Control (ABCC)*, a novel concept
- Lack of ABCC models focused on CE-IoT context

Thesis Statement:

A flexible attribute-based approach can be utilized to address security and privacy issues in the dynamic and rapidly progressive Cloud Computing and CE-IoT architectures. A detailed exploration of ABAC and ABCC, their formal models, and implementation in different contexts concerning Cloud Computing and CE-IoT can ultimately strengthen the access, authorization, and communication framework in these domains.





Example: Attribute-Based Authorization

User (u)

Object (o)



name: Alice
title: Manager


type: Sensitive
created_by: Alice

Auth_{read} (u, o)




Auth_{read} \equiv title(u) = Manager
 \wedge type(o) = Sensitive
Auth_{write} \equiv name(u) =
created_by(o)

Attribute-Based Access Control



- Next-Generation Access Control (NGAC) – By NIST
- Gartner predicts 2014 – “By 2020, 70 percent of enterprises will use ABAC as the dominant mechanism to protect critical assets” [source: <https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/security-controls/rbac-is-dead-now-what/>]



Users ↔ Roles ↔ Permissions on Objects





Fig. 1: Simplified OSAC Model (Adapted from Tang et al., 2014)

Role-Centric ABAC (Roles + Attributes)



- Facilitate attribute assignment through Group and Attribute Hierarchy






Fig. 2: Restricted Hierarchical Group and Attribute-Based Access Control (rHGABAC) Model
Extended from HGABAC [Servos and Osborn, 2015]



a) An Example of User Group Hierarchy
(Adapted from [Gupta and Sandhu, 2016])



b) User Attribute-value Hierarchy

- A *novel* enforcement architecture utilizing **Policy Machine** (by NIST) and **Authorization Engine** (our custom implementation component)
- **Policy Machine (PM):**
 - an open-source ABAC framework to express and enforce access control policies

PM Core Elements

- Users
- Objects
- User Attributes
- Object Attributes
- Operations
- Policy Classes, ...

PM Relations

- Assignment
- Association
- Prohibition
- Obligation

- ✓ **assignment**— relationships between policies, users and user attributes, objects and object attributes
- ✓ **association** – authorization policies based on attributes

- **Authorization Engine (AE):**
 - a RESTful service as an interface between PM and applications
 - provide authorization decisions (Allow/Deny)






Fig. 3: Authorization Architecture Utilizing PM and AE




- **Cloud-Enabled IoT (CE-IoT)**

- Seamless communication (devices-to-cloud, cloud-to-devices)
- Unlimited resources → compute, storage, etc.
- Meaningful insights → Data Analytics and Visualizations
- Virtual things/devices management, access control management, ...



- Amazon Web Services (AWS) IoT – a *CE-IoT platform*



[Source: AWS Website]

- Currently utilize customized policy-based access control
- Lack a formal access control model for controlling access and authorization in cloud-enabled IoT




Fig. 4: AWS IoT Access Control (AWS-IoTAC) Model within a Single Account
Extended from Zhang et al., 2015






Fig. 5: Smart-Home Use Case Utilizing AWS IoT and Cloud Services



A temperature sensor and thermostat use case

```
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [ {
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": "iot:*",
    "Resource": "*"
  } ]
}
```

Existing AWS Policy Structure:
Allows all the IoT operations on any resource in AWS IoT



Sensor Attribute:
Belongs = Home1

Light Attributes:
Location = Outdoor
Belongs = Home1

❖ Utilizing target things attributes through AWS Lambda function

```

...
var params2 = {attributeName: 'Location',
               attributeValue: 'Outdoor'
};
iot.listThings(params2, function(err, data) {
...
  for (i in data.things) {
    x = data.things[i].thingName;

    var params3 = {
      topic: '$aws/things/' + x + '/shadow/update',
      payload: new Buffer('{"state": {"desired": {"light": "ON"}}}'),
      qos: 0
    };

    iotdata.publish(params3, function(err, data){
      ...
    }
  }
}


```


Search and list things with
attribute name = *Location* &
attribute value = *Outdoor*

Publish update on all thing
shadows (outdoor lights here)
that has attribute "*Location = Outdoor*"
to turn on outdoor lights


AWS Lambda Function

- ❖ ABAC Including Attributes of Target Resources
 - ❖ Attributes of source and target things
- ❖ ABAC Including User and Group Attributes
 - ❖ Attributes besides thing attributes in access control policies
- ❖ Policy Management Utilizing the Policy Machine
 - ❖ Policy-Explosion
 - ❖ Customized policy management for enterprises






a) Access Control Oriented (ACO) Architecture [Alshehri and Sandhu, 2016]



b) Enhanced ACO (E-ACO) Architecture



AWS-IoTAC Model

- Policy-based access control
- ABAC in limited form
 - Client Attributes
 - Target Attributes

Alshehri and Sandhu, 2017

- VO-VO communications
- Operational and Administrative Access Control Models
 - ACLs, CapBAC, RBAC, ABAC






Fig. 6: Remote Health and Fitness Monitoring (RHFM) Example



Certificate and Crypto Based
Communication control

Attribute-Based Communication Control



Objects → O | Virtual Objects → VO | Edge virtual objects → EVOs | Access Control Policies → ACP |
Communication Control Policies → CCP | Database → DB | Other Services → OS






Fig. 7: A General Conceptual Attribute-Based Communication Control (ABCC) Model



a) Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) Model


b) Attribute-Based Communication Control (ABCC) Model




Secure Communication through certificates and crypto keys

Fig. 8: ABCC for Edge and Cloud Communication Model


- Basic Entities and Functions:
 - Two endpoints – *gateway* and *virtual object*
 - *Message* – the control unit (device data messages)
 - *Attributes* of entities (gateways, virtual objects, messages, contextual)
 - Message attributes within the message (*key, value(s)*)
 - Operation – *send*
 - Communication Control Function
 - Communication Control Policies based on attributes






ABCC Policies


- **Send Allow** $\rightarrow gowner(g) = owner(vo) \wedge heartrate(m) \geq 150 \wedge temp(m) > 104$
- **Send Filtered** $\rightarrow gowner(g) = owner(vo) \wedge heartrate(m) \leq 75$ (filter location)
- **Send Deny** \rightarrow If policy evaluation failed (e.g., $gowner(g) \neq owner(vo)$)




- AWS IoT and AWS Greengrass (Edge Computing Service)



PAP – Policy Administration Point
PDP – Policy Decision Point
PEP – Policy Enforcement Point
PIP – Policy Information Point




Device Shadow Update Time



Attribute Caching

→



- Developed and implemented ABAC and ABCC models in different context of Cloud and CE-IoT
- Presented novel enforcement frameworks to implement our models in real-world platforms
- Main goal of this research:
 - To depict the applicability and benefits of the attribute-based approach for access and communication control in Cloud and CE-IoT
 - To stimulate implementation and adoption of ABAC and ABCC models in real-world scenarios

- ABAC and ABCC in context of **Multi-Cloud architectures**
- ABAC and ABCC in other application domains with additional capabilities (e.g., *Trust mechanisms*)
- Applicability of ABCC in critical domains: *Battlefield IoT, Medical/Healthcare IoT, and Vehicular IoT*

Published:

- Smriti Bhatt, Farhan Patwa and Ravi Sandhu, An Access Control Framework for Cloud-Enabled Wearable Internet of Things. In Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE International Conference on Collaboration and Internet Computing (CIC), San Jose, CA, October 15-17, 2017, 11 pages.
- Smriti Bhatt, Farhan Patwa and Ravi Sandhu, Access Control Model for AWS Internet of Things. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Network and System Security (NSS), Helsinki, Finland, August 21-23, 2017, 15 pages.
- Smriti Bhatt, Farhan Patwa and Ravi Sandhu, ABAC with Group Attributes and Attribute Hierarchies Utilizing the Policy Machine. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), March 24, 2017, Scottsdale, Arizona, 12 pages.
- Smriti Bhatt, Farhan Patwa and Ravi Sandhu, An Attribute-Based Access Control Extension for OpenStack and its Enforcement Utilizing the Policy Machine. In Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE International Conference on Collaboration and Internet Computing (CIC), Pittsburgh, PA, November 1-3, 2016, 9 pages.

In preparation:

- Smriti Bhatt, Farhan Patwa and Ravi Sandhu, Attribute-Based Communication Control in Cloud-Enabled Internet of Things. Venue TBD.

Thank you!
Questions?